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Abstract 
Managers use a variety of strategies to deliberately manipulate company earnings to match a predetermined 
target by performing certain activities that alter or smooth income, achieve high earnings level or sway company 
share prices. This study examines the relationship and effects of managerial decisions on earnings 
management of companies in Nigeria using directors’ remunerations, dividend payments, changes 
in earnings, and changes in total net assets as surrogates for corporate managerial policies and 
decisions. The study relies on secondary data derived from various companies’ financial statements and the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange fact book to determine and measure the level of earnings manipulations of corporate 
financial statements, applying an all-inclusive multivariate analysis. The empirical analysis shows that earnings 
management intensity, measured by the absolute values of discretionary accruals reflects mixed outcomes when 
regressed on change in profits, dividend policy, directors’ remunerations and change in assets values. The 
finding suggests a need to further study board room dynamics as managerial decisions investigated in isolation 
may not provide a satisfactory clarification to the causal effects of earnings management. Perhaps, these 
accounts for the clear polarity in empirical conclusions since firm specific effects may well interface with 
managerial decisions structure.  
Keywords:  Corporate Earnings, Directors’ remunerations, Discretionary accruals, dividend Payments, 
Earnings management, Net total assets, 
 
1.0 Introduction  
The quality and credibility of annual reports of companies across the world and Nigeria in particular, has 
become considerably questionable due to recent corporate accounting scandals (Badawi, 2008; Enofe, 2010). 
These recent corporate financial scandals pose a great challenge to the veracity, utility and value relevance of the 
financial reports and quality of earnings reported by firms. Badawi (2008) has reported a list of companies 
involved in cases of accounting scandals related to earnings manipulations and financial misstatements in the US 
in the past decade. In Nigeria, corporate scandals such as the cases of Cadbury Nigeria Plc and African 
Petroleum plc (Okolie & Agboma, 2008); Savannah Bank and African International Bank (Odia, 2007); Wema 
Bank, Nampak, Finbank and Spring Bank (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010) and more recently Intercontinental Bank 
Plc; Bank PHB; Oceanic Bank Plc. and AfriBank Plc are known publicly reported cases that resulted in 
misleading financial reports. There is therefore a concern about the quality of accounting income and its 
relationship with the managerial policies and decision process, which has been observed to increase over time 
following the periodical clusters of business failures, frauds, and litigations. The issue is whether these corporate 
collapses are not the outcome of deliberate corporate strategies and conscious managerial decisions used to 
perpetrate Earnings Management. 
Earnings Management through discretionary accruals manipulations is motivated by the need for accounting 
adjustments and allocations made at the end of a given year for a number of reasons. Usually, accounting for 
routine exchange transactions does not result in accounting records being properly stated on the accrual basis to 
make adjusting and allocation entries at the end of the accounting period. The required adjustments are 
necessitated by the need to ensure that the financial accounts disclose a true picture of the transactions and 
operations of the organization, as well as comply with GAAP. While the key concept is that GAAP based 
accounting is supposed to reflect, and not obscure true economic performance, GAAP may also be violated by 
actions that result or do not result in fraud. GAAP rules are often arbitrary, complicated, and occasionally 
misleading (Revsine, 2002). GAAP permits many accounting choices and requires a great deal of estimation 
through accruals, deferrals and allocations, thereby facilitating earnings management by companies which make 
innumerable operating and accounting choices and hence engage in some form of earnings management 
(Schipper & Vincent, 2003).  
Corporate policies define the set of management decision taken at corporate level and provide a platform for 
organizational jurisprudence and rules of the workplace. On the other hand, Earnings Management is a strategy 
used by company managers to deliberately manipulate company earnings to match a predetermined target and 
involves the planning and execution of certain activities that manipulate or smooth income, achieve high 
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earnings level and sway the company’s stock price (Schipper, 1989; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Earnings 
management is primarily achieved by managed actions that make it easier to achieve desired earnings levels 
through accounting choices inherent in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). This is commonly 
occasioned by discretionary accruals manipulations that are likely to present some problems for a true and 
qualitative earnings report in emerging markets such as the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), (Healy & Wahlen 
1999). Knowing the significance of the impact of this primary indicator on stock prices, organizations have long 
been using various strategies and techniques, legal or illegal, to alter the earnings of a company in ways to attain 
certain outcomes or achieve specific objectives.  
This study relies on secondary data derived from various companies’ financial statements and the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) fact book to determine and measure the level of earnings manipulations in corporate 
financial statements. The study examines whether some identified managerial decision categories (directors' 
remuneration, dividend payment, increases in earnings, and increases in total net assets) are associated with 
earnings management. Thus, as one of the first studies to integrate the four major research aspects that have been 
disparate and incongruent, the study examines the effects of managerial decisions on earnings 
management of companies quoted on the NSE using directors’ remunerations, dividend payments, 
changes in earnings, and changes in total net assets as surrogates for corporate managerial policies 
and decisions.  
 
2.0 Literature Review 
 Extant literature relating to this study covers the areas of earnings management, corporate managerial 
decisions, and the relationship which subsists between earnings management and each of some perceived four 
corporate policies and managerial decision categories, including directors’ remunerations, dividend payment 
policies, earnings changes and Net total Assets of Companies.  
2.1 Earnings Management and Corporate Decisions 
Extant literature and result of previous studies indicate the impact of specific managers' decisions on the 
income of companies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) assert that managers fixed effects explain an economically 
significant proportion of a firm’s activities such as Research and Development (R&D) and Mergers & 
Acquisitions (M&A) suggesting that managers have individual effects on their firms. Similarly, a number of 
prior studies indicate that CEOs matter for various corporate decisions and subsequent performance (Graham, Li, 
& Qiu 2011; Jian & Lee 2011; Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011). Bamber, Jiang and Wang, (2010) show that 
individual managers have various disclosure preferences while Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, (2010) revealed 
that certain managers make more aggressive tax positions to affect their firms' effective tax rates. Ge, 
Matsunmoto and Zhang, (2011) posit that CEOs' individual styles influence accounting disclosures.  
Earnings quality may vary because of the individual CEOs employed. The individual managers affect the 
financial reporting of the firm in a systematic way. Evidence suggests that reputable managers receive a 
compensation premium (Falato, Li, & Milbourne, 2011; Graham et al. 2011). Thus, to the extent that earnings 
management tarnishes their reputation, higher-quality managers might be more hesitant to undertake these 
activities (Fama, 1997). Alternatively, if the expected cost of earnings management on high-ability managers' 
reputations is minimal, then the potential reputation loss might not be large enough to discourage opportunistic 
behaviour.  
Gabrielsen, Gramlich and Plenborg (2002) found a positive but non-significant relation between managerial 
decisions and discretionary accruals in a sample of Danish firms. Managerial decisions of firms are critical to 
the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms employed to constrain earnings management practice (Sikka, 2009; 
Dabor & Adeyemi, 2009). 
2.2 Earnings Management and Directors' Remuneration  
The increasing spate of corporate collapses has refocused the attention of stakeholders on executive 
compensation, involving issues affecting the design of executive compensation and the degree to which options 
truly support the stake of management and other stakeholders. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) considered and  
analyzed managerial opportunism in relation to discretionary behaviours against reported earnings and its 
influences on contractual outcomes and wealth transfers; confirmed and corroborated by Suh (1990) and 
Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001). Findings of McNichols and Wilson (1988) support income decreasing 
hypothesis regarding earnings management but not income smoothing hypothesis. Hart and Holmstrom (1987), 
Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) and Kreps (1990) view earnings management as a means to generate higher 
management compensations.  
Matsunaga and Park (2001), studied the effects of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEOs' 
annual bonus structures, found that CEO bonus plans provide them with economic incentives to meet quarterly 
analysts' earnings forecasts and also earnings from the same quarter in the prior year. Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) found that firms where the CEO compensation is closely linked with the value of firms' stock and option 
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holdings are more likely to use discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more 
pronounced in firms where CEOs' potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and 
option holdings. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) found that private information used by senior executives to time 
abnormally large stock option awards involve earnings management in order to increase cash payout from these 
awards, hence suggesting that such stock option awards need to be overseen by the directors.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) found that ex-post managerial discretions are made to increase compensation 
or to avoid debt covenant violations. Shuto (2007) studied the relationship between discretionary accounting 
choices and executive compensation in a sample of Japanese firms and revealed that the use of discretionary 
accruals increases executive compensation; company managers receiving no bonus adopt income – decreasing 
accruals and extraordinary items; negative extraordinary items are strongly associated with no bonus payment 
and there is association between discretionary accruals and executive bonus.  
Elitzur and Yaari (1995) showed that the choice of compensation scheme by owners tends to affect earnings 
manipulation and insider trading provides an informative signal about the direction of earnings manipulation. 
Dye (1988) found that earnings management increases remunerations of managers and existing shareholders 
who want to see the market value of their firm increase and thereby increasing the possibilities of wealth transfer 
from new to existing shareholders. 
2.3 Earnings Management and Dividends Payment 
Corporate managers usually engage in a number of vital decisions relating to the finances including 
dividend payout policies perceived as symbol of sound financial health of a company. Healy and Palepu (1990), 
studying firms' accounting and dividend responses to an increase in the tightness of dividend constraints, opined 
that accounting-based dividend constraints in lending contracts are imperfect means of mitigating conflicts of 
interests between stockholders and bondholders since managers have flexibility to make accounting decisions in 
order to circumvent the covenants. Unlike many US studies, Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen, (1996) found 
strong evidence of earnings management in Finland, where Finnish managers set earnings to satisfy the demand 
for dividends by institutional investors and owners with preference for stable dividends.  
Modigliani and Miller (1961) by assuming perfectly efficient market, proved that firm value cannot be 
increased by changing dividend policy number of a firm. However as perfect market do not exist in reality, 
literature provides a number of theories including clientele theory, agency theory, and signaling theory to show 
that dividends increases the value of equity and thus investors are more attracted towards dividend paying firms. 
Kato, Micho and Yasuhi (2002) provided evidence of dividend motivated earnings management. The results 
revealed direct relationship between earnings management and dividend payment policies of Japanese banks. 
Lintner (1956) showed that managers are reluctant to cut dividends and target long-term pay-out ratios when 
making dividend decisions. Current earnings influence current dividend decisions through the target payout ratio, 
defining ‘dividend conservatism’ as the partial adjustment in dividends, given the current financial performance, 
dividend change in any given year is only part of the amount indicated by the target pay-out ratio and current 
earnings. 
Baker and Powell (2000) and Baker, Veit and Powell (2001) conclude there is little change in manager’s 
views of dividend determinants over time, namely the level of current and expected future earnings, and the 
pattern of past dividends. The two studies also found that the desire to maintain a given dividend payout ratio is 
a moderately important factor in determining dividend policy. 
Haider, Alli and Sadiq (2012) examined the impact of earnings on dividend policy and analysis done on 
Pakistani listed companies using data from Karachi stock exchange for the period between 2005 and 2009, 
based on five variables which include dividend payout (dependent variable) and discretionary accrual (DA), self 
finance ratio (SFR), return on equity (ROE) and size of the firm (control variables). It was explained that a 
relationship exist between both of the variables with coefficient showing weak or no relationship. 
An analysis conducted by Shah, Hui and Zafar (2010) indicates the impact of dividend policy on earnings 
by taking the data of Pakistani and Chinese listed companies from year 2003 to 2007 and from 2002 to 2007 
respectively using two basic variables (dividend payout and earnings management) and three other variables 
(return on equity, size of firm and self finance ratio) as control variables. The results showed no relationship 
between earning management and dividend payout policy for both countries.. 
Savov (2006) examined the relationship between investment, earning management and dividend payment 
using data from German companies covering 1982 to 2003 periods. The results showed a negative relationship 
between earnings management and dividend payout policy. Farsio, Geary and Moser (2004) examined the 
relation between dividends and earnings. The quarterly data of 500 companies was used from the period of 1988 
to 2002. The study revealed no significant relationship between dividend policy and earnings in the long run and 
suggests different possibilities of relationship between future earnings and dividend.  
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2.4 Earnings Management and Changes in earnings  
A number of existing studies indicate the relationship and effects of earnings management on changes in 
earnings of companies. In Australia, companies have been found to manage their earnings to ensure positive 
profit reporting and sustainable earnings trends. Some of the studies reveal a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals calculated through Jones model, financial performance and growth of firms. Shin and 
Sonen (1998) studied the relationship between earnings management and earnings on a sample of 589 firms 
from 1975 to 1994 and revealed a strong negative association between the firms' net trade cycle (working capital) 
and its earnings.  
Some studies have pointed to the tendency of a strong negative correlation between the earnings and income 
smoothing behaviour of firms and that the firms with low profits possess greater propensity and higher 
motivation to apply earnings smoothing for the reported profits. Padachi (2006) examined the trends in earnings 
management and its impact on firms’ performance. The result provided that high investments and receivables 
are associated with lower earnings and that inventory days and cash conversion cycle had positive relationship 
with earnings.  
Vishnani and Shah (2007) investigated the impact of working capital management policies on the corporate 
performance of Indian consumer electronics industry and noted that inventory holding period, debtors’ 
collection period and net working capital cycle had negative relationship on earnings of firms while the average 
payment period had positive correlation with earnings. Samiloglu and Demirgunes (2008) analyzed the effect of 
earning management on firm earnings in Turkey for period of 1998 – 2007 and showed that account receivables 
period, inventory period and leverage significantly and negatively affect earnings while firm growth 
significantly and positively affect earnings. The results also confirm that cash conversion cycle, size and fixed 
financial assets had no statistically significant effect on earnings. 
2.5 Earnings Management and Changes in Total Net Asset 
One of the early studies on management’s incentives for fixed asset manipulation by Brown, Izan and Loh, 
(1992) examined the revaluation decisions in Australia and showed that larger firms which report a high profit, 
face a takeover or likelihood of labour strike threats, have greater incentives to undertake an upward revaluation 
of their assets. Brown et al (1992) also examined political costs as a motivation for managers to undertake asset 
revaluations and found that larger firms revalue assets more frequently than smaller firms. The hypothesis stems 
from the fact that larger firm with huge profits are more likely to be noticed by regulators and pressure groups 
that might have the power to reallocate resources from such large firms. Huge profits are usually associated with 
demands for higher taxes and/or other restrictions from these pressure groups (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). 
Increasing assets would help firms to reduce the rate of returns. Ball and Foster (1982) regard the size as a noisy 
proxy for political costs and use industries prone to strikes as coal mining, waterfront, metal trades, and building 
& construction (Perry, 1979). 
Gaeremynck and Veugelers (1999) created a theoretical model of asset revaluation and present some 
empirical evidence from Belgium regarding managerial motivations on asset revaluations. Using an analytical 
model, the authors examine the signaling motivation of managers in an environment where the probability of 
raising funds not only depends on the expected future prospects of its projects but also on its existing financial 
position. Revaluation decreases the expected costs of reorganization since a decision not to revalue may increase 
the leverage of a firm (debt to asset or equity ratio) leading to violations of its debt covenants. However, the 
decision not to revalue its assets increases the probability of receiving additional funds because it signals that it 
would be more successful without resort to revaluation. The study showed that a separating equilibrium can be 
achieved only when successful firms do not revalue assets because the expected cost of reorganization is smaller 
than the additional benefits received from additional funding. Gaeremynck and Veugelers (1999), however, 
contend that such strategy is not favourable in all circumstances. The strategy that is most favourable is those 
industries which are characterized by high variance in performance and low equity to debt ratio. 
Cotter and Zimmer (1995) examined some of the issues that were not explored by earlier researchers. The 
authors are concerned with the large number of independent revaluations carried out by firms where there are no 
restrictions. Furthermore, while independent revaluations are required in order to make the balance sheet more 
attractive, the widespread use of directors’ revaluation in financial statements also made the authors think about 
the motivation of such revaluations. The authors also question leverage as the only criteria for receiving 
additional funds and determining the borrowing capacity of firms.  
Black, Seller, and Manly (1998) extend the evidence on asset revaluation in the context of the United 
Kingdom (UK), Australia, and New Zealand. The authors examine whether firms are engaged in earnings 
management through sale of revalued fixed assets. Using a sample of 696 firm-year observations from the UK 
and 503 firm-year observations from a combined sample for Australia and New Zealand during the period 1985 
– 1995, the study examined whether revaluers and non-revaluers differ in terms of debt equity ratio, market-to-
book ratios or liquidity ratios. The result suggests that revaluers are larger and have more market capitalization 
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than non-revaluers, at least in Australia and New Zealand. Consistent with prior work, evidence from the 
analysis of the data suggests that both in the UK and Australia and New Zealand, revaluers are much different to 
non-revaluers in terms of leverage, book-to-equity ratios and liquidity. While the leverage of revaluers is much 
higher than non-revaluers, the liquidity is much lower. The result did not show any evidence of income 
smoothing behaviour by firms through the sale of revalued assets. Sales of revalued assets occur primarily 
because of sound investment and production reasons. 
Using large samples from 1989 and 1991 of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, Lin and Peasnell 
(2001) examine the relationship between contracting, signaling, and political environments and assets 
revaluation. They examine whether asset revaluation is used to fill equity depletion brought about by 
implementation of the UK accounting method, which requires firms to write off goodwill purchases to equity 
reserves. The selection of the two years (1989 and 1991) helped to examine whether firms store undisclosed 
revaluation reserves during periods of economic boom (1989) and report them during periods of economic 
downturn (1991). The result suggests that equity depletion is strongly related to asset revaluation, asset 
revaluation is also positively related to size, gearing and fixed asset intensity of the firm but negatively related to 
liquidity. The result support the contracting hypothesis and show that equity depletion, quick assets and size are 
important factors in determining when a particular firm revalues its assets. 
Jaggi and Tsui (2001) provided evidence of manager’s motivation for upward asset revaluation from Hong 
Kong. The study uses a sample of 481 firm-year observations during the period 1991 – 1995 drawn from the 
EXTEL database of Financial Times Information. The authors’ result shows that the most important motivation 
for asset revaluation is the signaling of the fair value of the asset to investors. This comes from the strong 
positive relationship between revaluation and future operating income. The results also reveal the alignment of 
the investors and managers assessment of asset values. The results further showed a relationship between share 
price increase and asset revaluation. They also present evidence in a setting where firms are mostly owned and 
controlled by family and indicate that revaluation is considered value relevant by the investors. 
Missionier-Piera (2007) presents evidence of economic motivations for asset revaluation of Swiss managers. 
Investigation of asset revaluation in Switzerland becomes interesting for a number of reasons: Firms in 
Switzerland use international accounting standards; international stakeholders are important to Swiss firms as a 
number of Swiss firms rely on international investors and customers and therefore provides the opportunity to 
examine the influence of international stakeholders on the choice of accounting treatment and the Swiss stock 
exchange is relatively illiquid and resembles more of a bank oriented market.  
McNichols and Stubben (2008), examining earnings management in the context of suboptimal fixed assets 
investment decisions by public companies with high and discretionary accruals, found that earnings 
manipulating firms over-invest substantially during the misreporting period and no longer over – invest 
following the misreporting period thereby suggesting that earnings management, in addition to targeting external 
stakeholders, can also influence internal decisions. 
2.6 Evidence of Earnings Management practices in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, prior studies closely related to the present study include Osisioma and Enahoro (2006), Akindayomi 
(2012) and Okolie (2013). Osisioma and Enahoro (2006), investigated whether financial accounting information 
users including Accountants, Company Managers, Investors, Investment Analyst, etcetera in Nigeria are aware 
of earnings management in the Nigeria private sector. Using, primary data obtained from structured 
questionnaire, a survey analysis of a sample of 300 practicing accountants was conducted. The study reported 
that earnings management present a definite effect on information users. Thus, the practice of earnings 
management   constructively benefits the manipulator of accounts. This further indicates that the genuinely 
positive aspect of the corporation is presented to the fullest proportion to the public, while the area of weakness 
is played down in the reports in anticipation of correcting the weakness. The financial status is enhanced to 
enable the company to be attractive. 
Akindayomi (2012) studied “Earnings Management and the Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Evidence from 
Nigeria” and found that Nigeria banks show a positive association between earnings before taxes and provisions 
for loan losses, indicating earnings smoothing, and that healthy banks have smoother earnings than distressed 
ones while distressed banks deliberately understate loan loss provisions to inflate earnings.  
Okolie, (2013) studied the effect and relationship between audit quality, earnings management and earnings 
response coefficients of quoted companies in Nigeria, and documented evidences that are consistent with the 
relationship and effects which audit quality exerts on earnings management from the perspectives of 
discretionary accruals manipulations and the manipulations of real economic operations of companies listed on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange and extended the relationship between audit quality and earnings management to 
the relationship and effects which audit quality exerts on the earnings response coefficients as well as market 
prices per share of quoted companies in Nigeria. Based on a sample of 342 companies – year observations from 
the NSE for the fiscal years, 2006 to 2011, and using four of the commonly applied audit quality measures 
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together, a massive and all-inclusive multivariate analysis was conducted. The result showed that audit quality is 
significant and negatively related to earnings management measured by discretionary accruals of quoted 
companies in Nigeria, exerts significant relationship with real earnings management and exerts significant 
influence on the earnings response coefficient and market price per share of quoted companies in Nigeria. 
 
3.0 METHODOLOGY  
This study adopts a cross-sectional survey based on 250 companies’ year observations for the period 2007 – 
2011. Relying on secondary data sourced from the CBN Statistical Bulletin, NSE fact book and annual reports 
and accounts of a sample of 50 quoted companies in Nigeria, the study applies multiple regression analysis to 
panel data. The following is the overriding hypothesis of this study: 
H0: Managerial Decision Categories do not directly relate to the Level of Earnings 
Management of Quoted Companies in Nigeria  
3.1 Estimation of Variables  
The dependent variable of the study is Discretionary Accrual used as proxy for earnings management while the 
independent variables include Director’s Remuneration, Dividend Payment, Change in earnings and change in 
Total Net Asset. The study examines whether each of these proxies for managerial decision categories is 
associated with earnings management. Discretionary accrual is measured using the Jones (1991) model as 
modified by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995), stated as:  
 
TAi,t/Ait-1 =αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i[∆REVit – ∆RECit/Ait] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] + εi,t …………………………………………….  (1) 
 
This model estimates the discretionary portion of total accruals. To partition total accruals into its discretionary 
and non-discretionary components, Jones (1991) used the following expectation model for total accruals to 
control for changes in the firm’s economic circumstances: 
 
TAi,t/Ait-1= αi[1/Ait-1]  + β1i[∆REVit/Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] + εi,t …………………………………....................................... (2) 
 
Where, for (1) and (2):  
TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm I; 
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t – 1 for firm i; 
∆REVit = Change in Revenues in year t less revenues in year t – for firm I; 
∆RECit  = Change in accounts receivables in year t less receivables in year t – for firm I; 
PPE it = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; 
εi,t = Error term in year t for firm i. 
 Jones (1991) used ordinary least squares regression for equation (2) to generate firm specific coefficients for 
αi, β1i and β2i. These coefficients were then used to estimate the level of non-discretionary accruals for each 
sampled firm as specified in the above equations. The level of discretionary accruals was then estimated by 
Jones (1991) using the following model to estimate the extent of earnings management: 
 
DAit= TAi,t /Ait-1- NDAit ……………………………………………………………………………... (3) 
 
Where: DAit = Discretionary accruals in year t for firm i 
 TAi,t = Total accruals in yeat t for firm I;  
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t – 1 for firm I; 
NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals in year t for firm I (TAit – DAit) 
3.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION  
The model for testing the effects and presumed relationships between dependent and independent variables 
considers the most commonly used proxies for managerial decision categories. We apply multiple linear 
regression analyses to test the relationship between the dependent variable (DAC) and the identified independent 
managerial decision variables. The model is specified as follows: 
 
DACit = α1+ α2DRit + α3DPit + α4PRit + α5TNAit + εit …………………............................... (4) 
 
Where:  DAC  = Amount of Discretionary Accruals of firm I at time t, 
DRit  = director’s remuneration variable for firm i at time t, 
DPit  = dividend payment variable for firm i at time t, 
PRit  = change in earnings variable for firm i  at time t, 
TNAit  = change in total net asset variable for firm i at time t, 
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εit  = the error term for firm i at time t, and 
α1, α2, α3, α4, α5 are firm specific parameters. 
3. 3 Measurement of variables 
 In this study, we used accounting accruals approach to measure earnings management. Accruals include a 
wide range of earnings management techniques available to managers when preparing financial statements, such 
as accounting policy choices and accounting estimates (Grace & Okoh, 2005) and (Fields, Lys & Vincent 2001). 
Director Remuneration (DR), Dividend payment (DP), changes in earnings (PR) and changes in Total Net Asset 
(TNA) were collected from the annual reports of the sampled companies in the Nigerian stock Exchange (NSE) 
data base. DR was defined as the value of salaries, emoluments, perquisites, bonuses and share option paid out to 
the directors of the organization in the period under review. DP was measured as the percentage of amount paid 
out to various share holders as dividend payment, PR was measured as changes in the value of earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) between one period and another while TNA which is the difference between total asset 
and current liability was measured as changes in total net asset between one period and another. 
 
4.0 Data Presentation and Analysis   
The models specified in the previous section are examined empirically. The study examines the causal effects 
and relationship between Managerial decision and earnings management in Nigeria. The descriptive and 
correlation analyses were first conducted before the regression assumption test on the variables. The last part of 
the analyses is the multiple regression analysis. For robustness, the sensitivity of the endogenous variables was 
tested by modifying the baseline equations to include distributive lags and interactions between variables. The 
regression analysis was conducted using the pooled OLS and the panel estimated generalized least squares 
(EGLS). Robustness Test section, test of robustness of the main results was conducted by modifying some 
aspects of the estimation equations. Finally, we begin by testing whether the coefficients of the variables are 
sensitive to the inclusion of new control variables in both equations. Lagged values of the explanatory variables 
were utilized for this purpose. In addition, the baseline equation is modified by including interactions between 
the variables in the model. The results of the analyses are presented in tables 1 to 6 below. 
 
5.0 Discussion of Results and Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
The NSE possesses a visible and aggressive position towards financial performance resulting from the 
convolution of financial intermediation in Nigeria. Despite the need to influence stakeholder perception, the 
recent notable cases of corporate collapses and financial scam in Nigeria stem from the NSE; hence providing a 
seeming reinforcement of this perception. This study was aimed at testing the relationship between earnings 
management and managerial decisions and to examine if this association differs amongst companies on the 
Nigeria Stock Exchange. The standard assumption is that each of the proxies for managerial decisions categories 
has different purposes with implications for corporate strategy and performance (Edwards & Nibler 2000; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). The discussion of results and findings, recommendations and conclusion are as 
stated below. 
5.1 Discussion of Results and Findings 
This section discusses the results and findings of study as follows. Each proxy for managerial decisions category 
is expected to influence earnings management differently.  
1. The panel fixed effects estimates indicate that Director Remuneration (DIRREM) exerts a positive effect on 
earnings management but this is not significant at 5%. In the distributive lag model that includes lags of the 
dependent variables (used as control variables), DIRREM remains positive and insignificant. This suggests 
that the effect of Director Remuneration (though positive) may not be significant to signal increased 
propensity for earnings management behaviours. Thus, from the baseline model results, the hypothesis of no 
significant relationship between Directors’ Remuneration and earnings management is accepted. The 
analysis result shows that the coefficient of the interacting term (DIRREM*DIVPAY) is positive, indicating 
that, given a stable dividend policy, increases in directors remuneration will result in an increase in earnings 
management. The result of this analysis is supported by Abbott, Parker and Peters (2003) and Baber, Kang 
and Liang (2006) which found no significant relationship between directors compensation using stock 
ownership and the occurrence of financial statement restatements. However, in contrast with our findings, 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) found that increased use of different forms of Director Remuneration 
provided executives with excessive incentives to artificially manage reported earnings. Outside directors 
may not directly involve in earnings manipulation, but some of them may know and choose to go along with 
such activities if they also benefit from manipulated earnings through increased compensations. In addition, 
Bersgtresser and Philipon (2006), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Ke (2005), and Burns and Kedia (2006) 
provide empirical evidence that directors with higher remuneration are more likely to manipulate earnings. 
Erickson et al (2006), however, failed to find any association between director’s remuneration and 
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accounting fraud. Various studies have also provided evidence of reverse-causality where executive 
compensation’s packages are a result of earnings management that inflates earnings and stock prices 
(Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Meek, Rao, & Skousen, 2007). 
2. The panel fixed effects estimates show that dividend payments significantly impacts negatively on earnings 
management at 5% significance level. In the distributive lag model, the control variables did not 
significantly influence the performance of the explanatory variables while dividend payments also impacts 
negatively and significantly on earnings management. In the model with interactions and distributive lags, it 
is observed that dividend payments maintained its negative sign but this was not significant at 5% level. The 
baseline model results (fixed effects) suggest a rejection of the hypothesis of no significant relationship 
between DIVPAY and Earnings Management. The result of this analysis is supported by Savov (2006) 
which examined the relationship between earning management and dividend payment for German 
companies of 1982 and found the existence of a significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and dividend payment policy. Also, Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen (1996) study undertaken 
for non-financial firms in Finland found that reported earnings were dependent on the dividend-based target 
earnings. The finding of kato, Michio and Yasushi (2002) conducted using Japanese banks also supports the 
result of this study. However, Fariso, Geary and Moser (2004) examined the relationship between dividends 
and earnings using quarterly data of 500 companies from 1988 to 2002 and found no significant relationship 
between dividend policy and earnings in long run. 
3. The panel fixed effects estimates indicate that ‘change in profits’ is positive but not significant at 5% level. 
In the distributive lag model, it was observed that the control variables did not significantly influence the 
performance of the explanatory variables and change in profits remains positive but not significant at 5% 
level. In the model with interactions, it is observed that change in profits appeared negative and significant 
at 5%. The baseline model results (fixed effects) indicate that the hypothesis of no significant relationship 
between change in earnings and Earning Management should be accepted. With respect to the direction of 
the relationship, the result of this study is supported by Lee (2006) who found no significant relationship 
between discretionary accruals and the financial performance. Furthermore, the studies of Brazel et al 
(2008), Holland & Ramsay (2003), Das & Zhang (2003) and Pandey (2001) have showed the existence of a 
significant and positive relationship between earnings management and firm’s earnings changes, while 
studies such as Farsio, et al (2004) have found a significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and change in firm’s earnings. 
4. The panel fixed effects estimates indicate that changes in total assets are negative and significant at 5% level. 
In the distributive lag model, it is observed that the control variables did not significantly influence the 
performance of the explanatory variables as change in assets also exerts a significant negative influence on 
earnings management. In the model with interactions, it is observed that change in assets has a positive 
slope. The baseline model results (fixed effects), suggests a rejection of the hypothesis of no significant 
relationship between change in assets and earnings management. This result is supported by that of Black, 
Sellers, and Manly (1998) study undertaken for firms in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand which showed 
no significant effects of total assets change on income smoothing behaviour of companies. 
5.2 Recommendations  
On the strength of the results of foregoing analysis and the discussion of the findings, this study recommends 
that: 
1. Regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Professional Accounting Bodies, 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, and the National Assembly, in their supervisory position, should 
distinguish between legitimacy, outright fraudulent reporting and earnings statements that reflect the desires 
of management rather than the underlying performance of the company and impose appropriate disciplinary 
penalties on offenders. Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in particular should strengthen efforts at ensuring 
higher quality financial reporting. 
2. Effective corporate governance should be established while relevant channels that may directly or indirectly 
signal an apprehensive financial environment that predispose managers to engage in earnings management 
should be identified and installed. Corporate governance is critical to the achievement and sustenance of 
financial reporting quality. This realization has been well entrenched in the US Public Companies 
Accounting Oversight (Sarbanes Oxley’s) Act, 2002 act following the reporting failures that occurred in 
Enron and other companies in the U.K. and the US. The existing corporate governance code in Nigeria 
amended in 2007, which restrictively focuses on the banking sector, should be given wider applicability 
across companies in different sectors. In order to enhance high Audit Quality and minimize Earnings 
Management, Companies in Nigeria should adapt to or engage in an outright adoption of currently available 
best practices like the provisions of Sarbanes Oxley’s 2002 and Public Companies Accounting Oversight 
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Board standards, the UK Financial Reporting Council’s Audit Quality Guidelines and Frameworks, 
followed by a statutorily backed earnings monitoring of companies in Nigeria. 
3. In Nigeria, unethical aspects of earnings management which may be pervasive require that the practice of 
forensic accounting be initiated. Financial statement alert on companies’ questionable accounting practices, 
will help guide investors in areas of the extent of a company’s earnings from operations, warning signs in 
the financial statements, changing accounting methods to more favourable ones, or using accounting 
methods different from the ones the competitors use, and assets or liabilities on (or off) the balance sheet 
that might affect future earnings. 
4. The principle based accounting system practiced in Nigeria, seems to provide excessive flexibility for 
companies to engage in practices that influences the financial reporting process for their private gain. 
Though, the rule based system is not without its peculiarities, certain measures should be introduced to 
minimize the propensity for reporting accountants to defeat the reporting principles for their private benefits. 
5. Attention should also be focused on companies’ attempts to smooth or increase earnings to beautify its 
attractions in the stock market through unnecessary manipulation of real economic operations and cash 
flows. Firm-wide performance measures in determining employee compensation that often lead to 
commonality and cohesion of purpose toward earnings management should be de - emphasized. We 
recommend that companies earn high quality income only through sales growth and cost reduction activities 
since repeatable and fairly predictable earnings that come from sales and cost reductions present the 
company’s earnings as high quality earnings in the eyes of investors.         
5.3 Conclusion 
 The long run pervasive effects of earnings management observed in several corporate collapses around the 
world has heightened stakeholder awareness and signaled considerable paranoid responses with regards to 
credibility of corporate earnings reports and financial statements. This study examines managerial decisions and 
earnings management in Nigeria by investigating the effect of director’s remuneration, dividend payment, 
change in earnings and change in total net asset used (as proxies for managerial decisions) on earnings 
management. The analysis shows that earnings management intensity measured by the absolute values of 
discretionary accruals and scaled by asset size, reflects mixed outcomes when regressed on change in profits, 
dividend policy, director remunerations and change in assets values. The study found the existence of no 
significant relationship between director remunerations and earnings management; a significant relationship 
between Dividend payment and Earnings Management; no significant relationship between change in earnings 
and Earnings Management, and a significant relationship between change in assets and earnings management. 
Directors’ remuneration and change in earnings show positive relationship with earnings management.  
The results of this study are subject to some limitations. The study is based on 250 company accounting 
year observations conducted using fifty (50) quoted companies on the NSE over the period 2007 – 2011. The 
study did not control for a number of governance attributes to mitigate the correlated omitted variables problem. 
The effect of these limitations is that external validity problem may be amplified to constrain the generalization 
of the results to cover different periods of time and different locations. The effects of inflation on figures related 
to financial statements, the estimation of discretionary accruals were ignored.  
These limitations notwithstanding, the study provides new evidence from Nigeria that changes in profits, 
dividend policy, director remunerations and changes in assets values are important variables of earnings 
management behaviour and the effect of these factors appear to be largely predictable. The findings suggest the 
need to investigate the board room dynamics as the managerial decisions examined in isolation may not provide 
a satisfactory justification to the underlying effects of Earnings management. This may probably be responsible 
for the apparent divergence in empirical results as firm specific effects might border on managerial decisions 
structure. This study represents one of the first studies in Nigeria to integrate the four major research aspects that 
have been disparate and incongruent, by focusing on the effects of managerial decisions on earnings 
management of companies quoted on the NSE and using directors’ remunerations, dividend 
payments, changes in earnings, and changes in total net assets as surrogates for corporate 
managerial policies and decisions.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Mean -1564.247 - 1667.391   6.83E+08   5.75E-09   50080425 
Median 9.58  6.73    67928000      1.70E+08   24515000 
Maximum 2191.14  19042.34   1.89E+10      1.17E+10    5.87E+08 
Minimum -402462  -409161.2    0.00   -1.80E+10   0.00 
Std. Dev. 25509.27  26001.81    1.89E+09    1.82E+09   75558995 
Jarque-Bera 627723.7  613699.2     22677.41    24859.67      2971.738 
Probability 0.000  0.000      0.000            0.000    0.000 
Observations  249  249      249          249       249 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from E - Views version 7.0 (2013) 
Where; DISACC = Discretionary Accruals; DIRREMit = director’s remuneration variables for firm i at time 
t; DIVPAYit = dividend payment variable for firm i at time t; ∆PROFITit = change in earnings variable for firm i 
at time t; ∆ASSETit = Change in total net asset variable for firm i at time t, 
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Result 
 
 
 
∆ASSET  1 
∆PROFIT  0.0170  1   
DIVPAY  0.022  0.023  1 
DISACC  -0.006  -0.030  0.015  1 
DIRREM  0.028  0.041  0.307  0.004  1 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from E - Views version 7.0 (2013) 
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Correlated Random Effects – Hausman Test 
                POOLED OLS                     PANEL OLS (RANDOM EFFECTS)         PANEL GLS(FIXED EFFECTS) 
                POOLED OLS                     PANEL OLS (RANDOM EFFECTS)         PANEL GLS(FIXED EFFECTS) 
Table 3: Hausman Test 
 
 
 
Test Cross-Section random effects 
Test Summary      Chi-Sq. Statistic  Chi-sq.d.f  Prob. 
Cross-section random      44.069626              4    0.00 
 
Source: Eviews 7.0 
 
Table 4: Regression Result 
 
 
 
VARIABLE     COEFFICENT    PROB    COEFFICENT   PROB        COEFFICENT            PROB 
   C                  56120683     0.757 -3.3E+07 0.843  -3.4E+07 0.000* 
∆ASSET         1107.413     0.958 1830.488 0.931  -62062.2 0.006* 
∆PROFIT        3414.501    0.859 4138.478 0.829  19362.13 0.173  
DIVPAY              -0.029     0.683    -0.0232 0.720       -0.054 0.011* 
DIRREM              0.823     0.717       1.569 0.408        0.003 0.098 
R
2
                            0.05         0.047         0.421 
ADJR
2
                    0.02         0.022         0.203 
F-Stat                   1.412         1.907         1.931 
P(F-Stat)              0.223         0.094         0.000 
D.W                          2.1             2.1             2.6 
 
Source: Author’s computation from E - Views version 7.0, (2013) 
In line with the Hausman test, the fixed effects result is shown in the equation below with p-values are in 
parenthesis. *Significant at 5% level. 
EARNMGT = -3.4E+07 – 62062.2 ∆ASSETS + 19362.13 ∆PROFIT -0.054 DIVPAY + 0.003 DIRREM + u 
(0.00)*     (0.006)*          (0.173)         (0.011)*           (0.098) 
 
Table 5: Regression Result (Distributive lag model) 
 
 
 
VARIABLE     COEFFICENT       PROB    COEFFICENT   PROB   COEFFICENT  PROB 
   C                1.58E+08        0.506 -55.8736 0.997 2637345  0.930 
∆ASSET          -10382.7     0.988 58567.44 0.627 -62130.8 0.043* 
∆PROFIT         17960.52     0.763 25576.21 0.438 16640.47 0.205 
DIVPAY                  0.008  0.939        0.011 0.597      -0.056 0.000* 
DIRREM                1.291  0.778        1.366 0.241       2.573 0.004* 
 
∆ASSETt-1          1492.687     0.964 2562.285 0.174   281.092 0.006* 
∆PROFITt-1         1307.162     0.966 1982.707 0.103     52.865 0.292 
DIVPAY t-1                -0.014     0.897      -0.023 0.547      -0.035 0.199 
DIRREM t-1              -1.694     0.739       0.035           0.0.983      -0.794 0.007* 
AR (-1) 
R
2
                           0.009           0.22        0.452 
ADJR
2
                   -0.009           0.18          0.23 
F-Stat                  0.09         0.354        2.046 
P(F-Stat)             0.99         0.954        0.008 
D.W                       1.9             2.0            2.6 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from E - Views version 7.0* (2013); significant at 5% 
In line with the Hausman test, we represent the fixed effects result in the equation below with p-values in 
parenthesis. *Significant at 5% level. 
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                POOLED OLS                     PANEL EGLS(RANDOM EFFECTS)         PANEL GLS(FIXED EFFECTS) 
EARNMGT 2637345-62130.8 ∆ASSETS + 16640.47 ∆PROFIT -0.056 DIVPAY + 2.573 DIRREM + 281.092 
∆ASSETS-1 + 52.865 ∆PROFIT-1 +  -0.035 DIVPAY-1 + -0.794 DIRREM-1 + u 
 (0.930)   (0.043)*         (0.205) (0.000)*     (0.004)*   (0.006)* (0.292) (0.292)    
(0.007) 
Table 6: Regression (Robustness) Result (Distributive lag model) 
 
 
 
VARIABLE      COEFFICENT    PROB       COEFFICENT   PROB        COEFFICENT   PROB 
   C                        54037320     0.789          53011194     0.7692        -3.3E+07           0.176 
∆ASSET               1225.82        0.955      3249.5      0.627           263.103           0.056 
∆PROFIT              -823.98     0.968      -3243.35      0.088          -2413.11           0.000* 
DIVPAY                 -0.031  0.856      -0.19116      0.122          -0.08634           0.104 
DIRREM                0.988  0.763      -0.2174      0.928             0.5541           0.069 
∆DIRREM*DIVPAY    7.66E-10         1.70E-10      1.35E-09      0.176         7.66E-10           0.169 
∆PROFIT*DIVPAY    0.0011                0.486      0.0018      0.195         0.0003           0.049* 
R
2
                      0.005        0.45           0.704 
ADJR
2
               0.003        0.41           0.619 
F-Stat                1.068        4.601           8.329 
P(F-Stat)           0.38        0.002           0.000 
D.W                   2.0        2.1           2.4 
 
Source: Eviews 7.0* significant at 5% 
 In line with the Hausman test, we represent the fixed effects result in the equation below; 
EM = 3.3E+07+ 263.103 ∆ASSETS – 2413.11∆PROFIT -0.056 DIVPAY + 2.573 DIRREM + 7.66E-10 
DIRREM*DIVPLAY + 0.0003 ∆PROFIT* DIVPAY + u 
(0.176)        (0.056)*         (0.000)* (0.104) (0.069)                   (0.169)               (0.049)*       
